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THE PATTERN OF CAPITAL
MOVEMENTS, 1950-54
Wenow proceed to the discussion of the pattern of capital flows
during the period 1950—54. In the first four sections of this chapter
the relative shares of the sources of the supply and the distribution
of the various types of capital are considered. This discussion is based
on Table 1 and on Appendix Tables B.I through B-Vu, covering the
individual types of capital. The next section discusses to what extent
the capital supply of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Continental countries of Group 1 was concentrated in the countries
of the respective trade orientations. Differences in the composition
of the capital supply of the U.K. and the Continent are also dis-
cussed. The last section of this chapter examines the distribution of
government aid and private investment between the advanced and
the underdeveloped countries.
An Over-All View
Total capital flows for the five-year period are shown in Table 1. As
can be seen, the bulk of all capital was provided by the industrial
countries (Group 1). If one eliminates the International Institutions
as independent suppliers (since they were more or less intermediaries
through which funds largely provided by Group 1 were channeled),1
Group 1 supplied close to 90 per cent. For government capital and
the major types of private long-term capital the percentages are even
higher, from 92 to 96 per cent. But short-term movements flowing to
Group 1 from the other groups raise the share of the latter to 10
per cent. These flows consisted mainly of increases in the dollar re-
1TheEuropean Institutions have been eliminated from Tabk 1 as independent
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serves and other liquid assets of all three of these groups and of a
$2 billion growth in the colonial sterling balances (Group 4).
The United States provided over half of all capital (55 per cent if
the institutions serving as intermediaries are excluded), the United
Kingdom approximately 9 per cent, and the Continent and Japan
over 25 per cent. In the share of the Continent and Japan short-term
movements again play a considerable part. These movements con-
sisted of two flows: one within Group 1to the U.S. in the form of
an increase in dollar reserves and other liquid assets of $3.5 billion
(of which Japan accounted for $.6 billion); the other consisting—
apart from EPU financing within Europe—mainly of export credits
and payments agreement balances extended to the other three groups.
The Continental credits, on the order of $1 billion, went mainly to
developing countries in Group 3, while Japan's ($200 million) went
to Far Eastern countries in Group 4. On the other hand, the United
States and the United Kingdom, as "key currency" countries, experi-
enced more moderate changes in their liquid currency assets; and
short-term credit extended by the U.S. was comparatively small, while
that of the U.K. decreased. The U.S. and U.K. were also the main
recipients of funds for repayments, redemptions, and repatriations,
which reduced their long-term capital outflows accordingly. The share
of the U.S. in the supply of grants and gross long-term capital and
that of the U.K. in the supply of private investment were thus con-
siderably larger than the over-all percentages indicate 2;theshares
of the Continent were correspondingly smaller. Japan provided vir-
tually no long-term capital or grants during this period.
Aside from movements of reserve balances, the capital provided by
lenders outside Group 1 was supplied mainly by Group 2. It con-
sisted of direct investment in all groups, the largest of which was,
however, Canadian investment in the United States. Another com-
ponent was the grants extended by Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand under the Colombo Plan to Asian countries in Group 4.
Among the Scandinavian countries, Finland paid reparations, and
Sweden extended a large loan, to Russia. But all these flows, other
than the Canadian investment, amounted to no more than one per
2TheU.S. shares of grants and direct investment, the largest types of supply,
were 80 and 60 per cent, respectively; the U.K. supplied 21 per cent of direct
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cent of the total. As lenders, except to Group 1, the other groups were
therefore unimportant.
Virtually all of the capital provided to the rest of the world thus
came from the industrial countries of Group 1. The capital supply
of the United States was, however, the only one with global dimen-
sions. Almost all countries received U.S. aid of some kind, and almost
as many attracted American private investment. The capital supplied
by the U.K. and the Continent was not only smaller, but also went
to far fewer recipients.
The Distribution of Government Grants and Loans
Government grants and loans are shown in Appendix Tables B-I and
B-Ia.8 Government capital exceeded private investment in the total
supply and in the supply to all groups except Group 2. The United
States accounted for almost three-fourths of total government capital
supplied. While U.S. government capital had many aspects and wide
geographical distribution, the political forces of the time led to a
high concentration of U.S. aid in several areas. The prime concern
was still with European recovery, followed by mutual security and
military build-up in the later part of the period. Close to 60 per cent
of total U.S. aid consequently went to the industrial countries, West-
ern Europe, and Japan (Group 1). A substantial part of U.S. grants
and loans flowing to Group 2 was likewise in this category: recovery
and mutual security aid to Scandinavia and loans for the production
of strategic materials to Sterling Area countries.
While government aid for the development of backward countries
had already been recognized as a necessary policy, the larger part of
U.S. aid to the underdeveloped areas consisted also of aid for recon-
struction and military emergencies. Of the countries of Group 3, those
in Southeast Europe on the periphery of the Soviet bloc received the
greater part of U.S. aid (Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia). Of the
8 In Appendix Table B-I, grants and loans net of repayments are shown, while
Appendix Table B-Ia gives grants and gross loans. In Appendix Table B-Ia grants
and loans are classified by types and purposes. There are, o( course, no sharp
dividing lines between some of the categories. The distinction between aid to
"strategic countries," where large aid was given in response to urgent cold war
emergencies, and that to Iran and India ("development aid"), for instance, is per-
haps one of degree only.48 Measuring International Capital Movements
countries in Group 4, those in the Far East received the most (Korea,
Taiwan, Philippines, and Indochina). What might be called "pure"
development aid constituted only billion, or 15 per cent of the
total U.S. government capital supply of $14.7 billion during this
period. Thç greater part of it, moreover, was in the form of loans,
while most other U.S. aid was in the form of grants.4
U.S. aid to Europe may be said, however, to have done double duty.
First, it gave rise to intra-European aid, which was directly induced
by, and largely contingent upon, American aid. Second, it enabled
the European countries to provide aid outside the OEEC region.
The metropolitan powers supplied substantial aid to their depend-
encies. Aid received from the U.S. was far in excess of the aid extended
by European countries, except in the case of France; even in this case,
however, U.S. aid came close to the exceptionally large metropolitan
aid. While the European aid also included emergency aid, like British
aid to Malaya, it was largely development aid, and the combined
European supply of this type of aid was absolutely larger than the
corresponding American aid. Thus, although the pure development
aid of the United States itself was small, the aid to Europe helped
to generate aid to underdeveloped areas.
Relatively few independent countries received aid from European
governments, apart from British-French participation in aid to Yugo-
slavia. What there was, moreover, consisted largely of contractual
obligations, such as German and Italian reparations to Israel, Greece,
and Yugoslavia. Virtually no European aid was extended to Europe's
former colonies or spheres of influence in Asia and the Middle East.
It was to these countries that the United States extended the larger
part of its development aid, assuming to some extent responsibilities
that had been vacated by the former colonial powers. The Greek-
Turkish aid program is a celebrated example, but the pattern was
widespread. Colombo Plan aid by Canada and Oceania also fulfilled
this role.
On the other hand, the traditional American sphere of interest,
Latin America, received only a small part of the development aid
dispensed by the United States, and virtually all of it was in the form
of loans, mainly Export-Import Bank loans. This Latin American aid,
moreover, clearly contained the element of export promotion. Many
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of the loan commitments dated back to the early 1940's before aid had
become an official policy. Both in kinds of projects and in country
distribution they were akin to the commercial loans of the
While total U.S. development aid was inversely related to the level
of development, i.e., the absolute amounts increased from Group 2
downward,° much of the aid to Latin America went to the advanced
countries of the region. All the Latin American countries in Groups 2
and 3 borrowed from the U.S., while only four of the eleven in
Group 4 did so. This distribution is similar to that of private loans,
which also covered the export of American equipment to the de-
veloping, rather than the underdeveloped, among these nations.
Aid by the International Institutions, [BRD loans, and UN grants
constituted only 7 per cent of the total, of which IBRD loans ac-
counted for two-thirds. While the first loans of the Bank had been for
European reconstruction, during this period IBRD loans were made
mainly for development, and the share of Group 1 was only 8 per cent.
In the other groups the advanced countries were, however, the chief
borrowers. The shares declined with the level of development, Groups
2, 3, and 4 receiving 44, 30, and 17 per cent, respectively, as did the
ratio of the number of borrowers to member countries in each group.7
The average size of the loans was also several times larger in Groups
2 and 3 than in Group 4. IBRD loans, the granting of which depends
on the existence of well-planned, economically feasible projects, thus
went mainly to more advanced countries which had a greater abun-
dance of such projects. In view of this problem, the Bank had already
instituted a policy of aiding underdeveloped countries, through tech-
nical missions, to plan feasible projects.8 But the results of this policy
were not reflected in the distribution until the later 1950's when close
to half of the total amount of loans was made to Group 4. During
the earlier period, the Bank provided, in effect, capital for expansion
6 Over one-third of the Latin American aid total, a $300 million Export-Import
Bank loan to Brazil, was in fact for the purpose of funding short-term debts to
American exporters, i.e., for trade which had already taken place.
6 See p. 79, below.
7 In Group 2, 8 of 11 members borrowed; in Group 3, 5 out of 10; in Group 4,
10 out of 25. Moreover, the nonborrowers in Group 2 were Canada, which was
not eligible since it had unlimited access to the market, and Sweden and Denmark,
which were receiving American aid.
8 For a discussion of the early policies of the IBRD, see Raymond F. Mikesell,
United States Economic Policy and International Relations, New York, 1952, pp.
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of the overhead sector of the countries which also received, as we
shall see, large manufacturing investment. The loans thus performed
mainly the function of complementing private investment in those
countries where it was concentrated rather than substituting for it
in the least developed countries.
UN grants were of even less importance as aid to underdeveloped
areas. Apart from Korean relief, they consisted, to a large degree, of
refugee aid, mainly in Europe and the Arab countries. Since in the
latter case the aid was in the form of imports for the refugee camps,
it probably had little effect on the countries concerned (with the pos-
sible exception of Jordan where the refugees were somewhat more
integrated with the economy). Economic and technical assistance was
small. UN aid was thus more humanitarian than economic in nature,
and the amount going to the underdeveloped countries themselves
made up only a small fraction of their aid receipts.
The Distribution of Private Long-Term Capital
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
Portfolio investment, i.e., the underwriting of foreign securities in
the financial centers ("Issues" in Appendix Table B-Il), the chief
form of international lending prior to the depression of the 1980's,
did not regain its previous importance after the war. It accounted for
only 20 per cent of the total private investment during this period,
while direct investment made up 70 per cent and loans extended by
the private sector, 10 per cent. The obstacles to the revival of port-
folio investment lay in the widespread defaults of the interwar period
and the restrictions on lending in European markets. To some degree
the lack of demand by countries receiving large-scale aid also seems
to have played a role, particularly in the case of the Western Euro-
pean countries. These countries borrowed only moderately in the
Swiss market during this period, while they had floated some issues
in New York before the Marshall Plan and did so more extensively
after aid had ceased in the second half of the 1950's.
The underwriting of new issues was, therefore, highly selective.
Apart from the issues of the IBRD (which was, of course, established
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borrowings accounted for more than one-fifth of total new issues),
the issues of independent countries and those of the dependent ter-
ritories must be distinguished. The latter were floated under favor-
able conditions in the metropolitan marketsand served largely to
supplement aid (particularly in the British colonies and the Congo),
but accounted for only one-fourth of the total (excluding IBRD
issues).
Among independent countries, the advanced countries were the
chief borrowers, with the countries of Group 2 more prominent than
the industrial countries. Nine of the fifteen countries in this group
were borrowers (three in two markets) compared to six in all other
groups. Only two small new issues were floated by underdeveloped
countries, Peru and Ceylon (the Panamanian issue represented re-
funding). Group 2, with 70 per cent of the total (excluding the IBRD),
had the largest share in all of the three main markets where inde-
pendent countries could or did borrow: the U.S., the U.K., and Swit-
zerland. In the U.S., where Group 2 countries were the only borrow-
ers, Canada and Israel accounted for most of the money raised. One
may argue that these represent special cases, in that Canadian securi-
ties are not considered "foreign" by American investors,10 and the
Israeli issues had an emotional appeal. Yet the high economic level
of Canada is, of course, responsible for the investors' attitudes, while
the large inflow of skilled labor and managerial ability into Israel
represents a condition that is absent in underdeveloped countries.
The advanced economic level of these borrowers must be considered
a precondition for their access to the market.
For balance-of-payments reasons, the British capital market was
virtually restricted to the Sterling Area, but the domestic demands
on the market curbed lending there also. Apart from the colonial and
Rhodesian government issues, lending was confined to investment
that would aid the balance of payments.11 Under this criterion, mainly
enterprises in the advanced sterling countries seem to have qualified,
9 See, e.g., OEEC, Sixth Report of the OEEC, Paris, March 1955, Vol. II, p. 215.
10 See Hal B. Lary and associates, The United States in the World Economy,
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1943, p. 94; use Mintz, Deterioration in the Quality
of Foreign Bonds Issued in the United States, 1920—1930, New York, NBER, 1951,
p. 10; and Paul Meek in U.S. Private and Government. Investment Abroad, Ray-
mond F. Mikesell, ed., Eugene, Ore., 1962, p. 241.
11 Midland BankReview, February1952, p. 12; 1954, p. 12.52 MeasuringInternational Capital Movements
particularly the South African and Rhodesian mining companies with
long-established markets.
With the exception of Switzerland, the Continental markets were
generally closed to outsiders (except the dependencies) because of the
domestic demand for reconstruction and balance-of-payments pres-
sures.12 While there were few restrictions in Switzerland until later,13
the experience of defaults and unsatisfactory prewar debt agreements 14
also confined Swiss lending chiefly to advanced countries.
The outstanding securities that were bought (the positive entries
for "Redemptions and Trading" in Appendix Table B-IT) were also
mainly those of the advanced countries, particularly those of the
United States and Canada and, to a lesser extent, of Group 2 sterling
countries.15 Substantial purchases were also made of a few interna-
tional blue chips, chiefly shares of the Shell group (in the Nether-
lands and the U.K.), British Petroleum (in the U.K.), and South
African mining companies.16
While even among the advanced countries there were few whose
securities were bought, among the underdeveloped there were fewer
still, and most of the amounts were extremely small. Moreover, for
the most part, these purchases do not seem to have been genuine
portfolio transactions, but rather were connected with direct invest-
ment or were a by-product of other transactions. In the case of India,
for instance, where the largest security purchases in Groups 3 and 4
were made, the amounts partly represent purchases of subsidiaries'
12 The French and Italian markets were completely closed to outsiders, and the
Dutch until 1954 (Paul Meek, "The Revival of International Capital Markets,"
American Economic Review, May 1960, p. 286; and UN, The International Flow
of Private Capital, 1956—1958, New York, 1959, p. 65). The Dutch IBRD issue was
floated in that year. There was possibly also a small issue by Surinam and one by
the Belgian government, perhaps included in government loans.
13 During the Suez crisis from 1956—58 the Swiss market was closed to foreign
borrowers (see UN, cit., p. 62); afterwards foreign access was rationed (see
Charles P. Kindleberger, "European Economic Integration and the Development
of a Single Financial Center for Long-Term Capital," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,
Band 90, 1963, p. 200).
14 See "Swiss Capital for Export," Three Banks Review, September 1951.
16 Since the data for Redemptions and Trading in Table B-I! are net totals for
the five-year period, large redemptions or sales conceal substantial purchases in
several cases, apparent from annual totals or other data, viz., Canada, where U.S.
purchaseswere upward of $400 million; U.K. (by U.S., $26 miflion); and Australia
and Rhodesia (by U.K., $23 and $11 million).
16 See Paul Meek in U.S. Private and Government Investment Abroad, op. cit.,
p. 247, and in American Economic Review, May 1960, p. 284.The Pattern of Capital Movements, 1950—54 53
obligations by foreign parent companies or by other buyers of the
parent's nationality, and partly represent credit (by accepting shares)
extended by foreign suppliers of machinery and equipment to Indian
companies.1T Acquisitions of securities are also the by-product. of
technical assistance when it is paid for in the shares of the assisted
foreign enterprise.18 Portfolio purchases in the ordinary sense were
thus negligible in underdeveloped countries.
In brief, portfolio investment provided development capital only
for the dependencies, not for the independent underdeveloped coun-
tries. How much access even the territories will have to the markets
after independence remains to be seen.
DIRECTINVESTMENT
In contrast to portfolio lending, direct investment (Appendix Table
B-Ill) was widely dispersed. The dispersion was greatest in the case
of the United States, which accounted for 60 per cent of the total.
While almost all countries received direct investment,it was the
advanced countries (Groups I and 2) that attracted almost 70 per cent
of the total.19 Substantial investment was made in the industrial coun-
tries themselves, both by the U.S. in Europe, and by the latter in the
U.S. There was also large Canadian investment in the U.S. and, to
a smaller degree, Canadian investment in the United Kingdom. Intra-
European investment was comparatively small, on the other hand,
much smaller than trans-Atlantic investment by Europeans.
All the same, the direct investment capital inflow to Group 1
amounted to less than one-fourth of total direct investment. Group 2
again attracted the largest share, almost half of the total. Both the
United States and the United Kingdom made their largest invest-
ments in the countries of this group—the U.S. in Canada, and the
U.K. in the sterling countries, particularly in Australia and South
Africa.It was characteristic of direct investment, moreover, that
countries attracting large investments from the center of their trade-
iT See Reserve Bank of India, Report on the Survey of India's Foreign Liabilities
and Assets as on 31st December 1953, Bombay, 1955, PP. 11—12, 84; and Report
31st December 1955, Bombay, 1957, p. 11.
18 See Jack N. Behrman, "Promoting Free World Economic Development Through
Direct Investment," American Economic Review, May 1960, P. 271.
19 The distribution of receipts by groups was: Group 1, 24.5 per cent; Group 2,
44.6 per cent; Group 5, 12.6 per cent; Group 4, 18.5 per cent (of which the Over-
seas Territories accounted for 9 per cent).54 MeasuringInternational Capital Movements
orientation often received additional direct investments from other
sources, except in cases where the investment was primarily or ex-
clusively in primary production. Thus, Canada attracted substantial
investment from the U.K. and the Continent; the sterling countries
from the U.S., the Continent, and each other. The large share of
Group 2, therefore, was not only due to the very large U.S.-Canadian
investment, but also to the fact that these advanced countries were
generally attractive to investors.
In the underdeveloped areas, the largest U.S. investment was made
in the more advanced Latin American countries of Group 3, exceed-
ing the combined American investment in all other underdeveloped
areas. These countries, especially Mexico, also received additional
investments from other sources. The main European investment in
the underdeveloped areas went to the overseas territories, the British
investment in the dependencies being the largest. Few European in-
vestments were made in the independent underdeveloped countries
other than the Latin American countries of Group 3. India was the•
only country to receive substantial British investment, accompanied
by American and other investment. The independent countries of
Group 4 received the smallest share of U.S. investment and very little
direct investment from other countries. Direct investment was highly
trade-oriented, moreover, so that Latin American and other U.S.-
oriented countries obtained, most of the American funds that did
move to Group 4.
We defer a discussion of the industrial composition of direct in-
vestment until later. The question of the extent to which the invest-
ment was made in production for the market of the, host country and
the extent to which it consisted of investment in raw material pro-
duction for export helps to explain the distribution between groups
described above,. This question will be treated below, where capital
flows in relation to levels of development, are considered in more
detail.
PRIVATE LOANS
Loans by the private sector (shown in Appendix Table B-IV) were
typically of intermediate-term maturities and largely offset by repay-
ments. They were thus not a major vehicle for lông-term capital
transfers. The lenders were mainly American, Swiss, and other Euro-
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mately two-thirds were made to governments or were guaranteed by
the government of the borrower. Some large movements occurred
between private concerns, chiefly of advanced countries, and a few
loans to underdeveloped countries were extended by American and
European firms supplying equipment and materials to, or operating
in, these countries.
The• loans were extended mainly to industrial or other advanced
countries (72 per cent to Groups 1 and 2). In part these loans were
connected with recovery aid(e.g., Export-Import Bank—guaranteed
loans to Japan), and in part they replaced it,as aid diminished
in the later years of the period. Among the underdeveloped countries
only a few of the more advanced Latin American countries received
major loans. The share of Group 4 amounted to only 5 per cent of the
total.
REDEMPTIONS AND REPATRIATIONS
To what degree did return flows of private capital modify the dis-
tribution of the supply? Redemptions by, and foreign sales to, the
residents of the debtor country of portfolio securities(the negative
entries in Appendix Table B-il) 20 were largest for Group 2, which
was also the largest recipient of private capital. While a number of
underdeveloped countries made such payments, these were substantial
only in the case of Brazil, and they were generally larger for the more
advanced countries than for the least developed.
There were other return flows which came mainly from Groups 3
and 4, however. We have called them Extraordinary Repatriations
(shown in Appendix Table B-V) because they took place largely as a
result of political events or under political pressure.2' Apart from
special movements (such as the liquidation of Italian investment in
settlement of reparations and the sale of German real estate by for-
mer refugees when the proceeds became transferable), they were re-
patriations largely of British capital from Latin America and, in the
wake of independence, from former colonies. They consisted of corn-
20 Although a separation of redemptions from trading in Appendix Table B-Il
was not possible, the negative entries mostly seem to represent redemptions. In
the case of the United States, which reports receipts of redemptions by area, these
amount to over 80 per cent of the total.
21 These transactions are reported in the host countries' records or other sources
with indications that the entries were of this kind. They do not include ordinary
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pensation payments for nationalizations and proceeds of sales, often
to the host governments, of railroads, utilities, and other enterprises
largely engaged in primary production. In the case of former colonies
they included the liquidation and transfer of savings of departing
personnel.22
The repatriation of ownership of railroads and utilities, mainly of
British investment in Latin America, represented part of a process
which started after the war and included the well-known sale of the
Argentine railroads in 1947 to the Argentine Government for over
£250 million. Many of these enterprises had become unprofitable, it
is true, and the owners were willing to sell.23 But in view of the con-
tinuing nationalizations of American and European utilities in Argen-
tina, Brazil, and Colombia, for instance, sometimes by seizure, some-
times after a rate increase had been refused, one can assume that the
British firms would have suffered the same fate.
In former dependencies, on the other hand, unfavorable investment
climates led also to liquidations of previously profitable agricultural
enterprises, particularly in Ceylon and to some degree in India,24
while nationalizations occurred in some other countries.
Compared to the direct investment made during this period, the
were small. They resulted, however, in net capital out-
flows from a number of the U.K.-oriented countries of Group 4 and
reduced the net receipts of others substantially. The Latin American
repatriations constituted, together with the large sterling bond re-
demptions by Brazil, a withdrawal of British capital in an area which
had once been a major field of British investment.
Short-Term Capital Movements
In a number of countries short-term inflows supplemented long-term
capital receipts. These movements consisted of cumulative short-term
credits and, in some cases, of substantial drawings on currency re-
serves.
22 This accounts for three-fourths of the outflow from India, and for the repa-
tnation from Indonesia.
23 See "British Investment in Latin America," Three Banks Review, June 1949.
24 For the conditions that led to sales and breakups of efficient tea estates and
rubber plantations in Ceylon, see IERD, The Economic Development of Ceylon,
1958, pp. 24—25, 75 if.,143, 516. Regarding the liquidation and sales of foreign
enterprises in India, see Reserve Bank of India, op. cit., 1955, pp. 19—20.The Pattern of Capital Movements, 1950—54 57
SHORT-TERM CREDITS
As far as short-term credit represents the customary financing of
international trade or results from trade through the time element
involved in transportation and payments procedures, it consists of
temporary financing rather than capital movements. With increasing
trade such short-term credit outstanding must necessarily increase, but
normally for both the assets and liabilities of a country. Appendix
Table B-VI shows, therefore, net inflows or outflows by groups of
countries and for individual countries with major transactions in order
to indicate where cumulative inflows occurred.25
Such cumulative credits were on the order of $1.3 billion. The
lenders were mainly Germany and other Continental countries (ap-
proximately $900 million) and the United States and Japan ($200
million each). The credits consisted partly of formal export credits,
mainly in the case of the Continent, and partly of "forced" credits
in the form of payment arrears resulting from a lack of foreign ex-
change (mainly in the case of credits extended by the U.S.) and of
payment agreements balances (Continent and Japan). The chief recipi-
ents of the U.S. and Continental credits were the more advanced
underdeveloped countries in Latin America and Southern Europe
(Group 3), where rapid development induced such movements. Brazil
and Turkey were particularly heavy borrowers. The Japanese credits,
covering largely textile exports, went to Far Eastern countries, three-
fourths of the amount to Indonesia.26 The Continental credits con-
siderably exceeded all other capital provided by the Continent outside
25AppendixTable B-VI shows an over-all discrepancy, after all possible adjust-
ments, between changes in assets and liabilities of $1.2 billion. From the pattern
of discrepancies between areas in the matrix constructed on the basis of the IMF
area system (mentioned above in the explanation of Type VI), it appeared that
close to $1 billion of the total discrepancy represents credits provided, but not
reported, by the Continent, well over half of this amount by Germany. This con-
clusion is supported by the error items in the German and other Continental
countries' balances of payments and by other evidence (see e.g., UN, The Inter-
national Flow of Private Capital, 1956—1958, op. cit., pp. 71—75; Paul Meek, Ameri-
can Economic Review, May 1960, p. 287). We concluded that the Continent, instead
of the net inflow of residual credit of $105 million shown in Appendix Table B-VI,
had a net outflow on the order of $900millionto the other groups, mainly Group 3.
For a fuller explanation, see Walther P. Michael, op. cit., Appendix B, Matrix IX,
pp. 354—366.
26Over-all,however, Japan was a net borrower, receiving credits from, or falling
in arrears to, the U.S. ($60 million) and Europe ($90 million) in addition to net
purchases from the Fund. Indonesia, on the other hand, made large repayments,
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the dependencies. To a large degree the Continental capital supply
was, therefore, directly connected with export promotion.27 In the
case of Japan these credits were virtually the only capital provided.
RESERVES AND CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNTS
The increase in reserves and other liquid assets (Appendix Table
B-Vu) during this period occurred largely in the holdings of the
advanced countries. The later Marshall Plan aid was used, as is well
known, to build up reserves in both dollars and gold. But other ad-
vanced countries also showed substantial increases. While the majority
of the underdeveloped countries also increased their reserves, the
increase by group becomes smaller toward Group 4(excluding
dependencies), where it was negative, and where two-thirds of the
decreases occurred. The large decreases consisted mainly of reductions
in sterling balances, a good part of which had been accumulated
during, and blocked after, World War II, but were then gradually
released by the United Kingdom.28 Sterling accumulations of the later
1940's, particularly by Continental countries, were then also decreased,
so that there was a net reduction in the liabilities of the United
Kingdom to independent countries of $.5 billion.29 While the cases
of over-all decreases in reserves are thus partly due to the withdrawals
of excessive and involuntarily held sterling balances, balance-of-pay-
ments pressures led also to reductions in dollar reserves in Brazil and
some other countries.80
The case of Ireland is of special interest because the larger part of
external finance for its development was provided by the liquidation
of Irish assets abroad. To the reduction in sterling balances (commer-
cial bank assets in this case) must be added large sales of British secu-
rities by Irish investors. A comprehensive development program by
27SeePaul Meek, op. cit.
28Atthe end of 1949, some billion of World War II balances were stiil
blocked, over half belonging to India, with Egypt and Pakistan accounting for
another fourth. See holds the Sterling Balances?", The Banker, May 1950,
pp. 95ff.
29Thelarge increase in the colonial sterling balances represents a special case,
which is discussed below.
30Seealso IMF, international Reserves and Liquidity, Washington, D.C., 1958.
"In some countries, such as India, the reduction in reserves represented heavy
spending on -development"(p. 51);"... manynon-industrialized countries have
decreased their reserves. In some countries these decreases were planned and used
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the government caused extensive domestic investment by the private
sector which was financed to a considerable degree by these repatria-
tions of private capital, which had been invested in Britain during
years of economic stagnation at home.81 The Irish case suggests that
other flight capital, such as the billions of dollars of Latin American
capital supposedly placed in the United States and Switzerland,82 may
return if political and monetary stability is achieved in such countries.
Substantial inflows of short-term capital thus occurred in a number
of cases, both in the form of credit and by drawing on reserve balances
or other liquid assets. For some countries, movements in one form
were cancelled out, however, by changes in the other (e.g., Colombia
received large credits, but increased its reserves by a similar amount;
the reduction in India's sterling balances was largely offset by a credit
outflow). For others, the net addition to the long-term capital inflow
was relatively small. It was only in Ireland (counting the portfolio
repatriation), Brazil, Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt that the additions
were substantial. For the underdeveloped countries as a whole, these
short-term movements increased the capital supply only moderately
and mainly for the more advanced of these countries. For Group 3 it
meant an addition of approximately 20 per cent to the long-term
inflow of government and private capital, but for the independent
countries of Group 4 the addition was less than 3 per cent.
The large increase in the sterling balances of the British Colonies,
on the other hand, had a drastic effect since it offset by far British aid
and investment in the territories, resulting in a net outflow from the
Colonies to the United Kingdom of $600 million. The larger part
of the.balances represented the collaterals of currency boards and the
funds of marketing boards and other official bodies, which were re-
quired by statute to be held, wholly or partly, in sterling securities.83
While all the various territories increased their balances, three-fourths
of the total was accounted for by West Africa, the Malayan region,
81 See Chapter 3, footnote 9. The following amounts are involved: U.S. aid, $79
million (Appendix Table B-I); U.K. purchases of Irish bonds, $44 million (Appen-
dix Table B-Il); total foreign capital, $123 million; repatriation—sales of British
securities, $131 million (Appendix Table B-I!), repatriation—reserves, $29 million
(Appendix Table B-Vu), total Irish repatriation, $160 million.
82 See,e.g., "Economic Development in South America," JEC,87thCongress,
2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1962, p. 1.
83 See Ida Greaves, The Colonial Sterling Balances, EssaysinInternational
Finance, No. 20, Princeton, 1954, passim.-
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and Hong Kong. In Hong Kong the increase seems to have been due
to large inflows of refugee capital and gold hoardings from mainland
China.34 In West Africa and Malaya the large sterling accumulations
were due to high commodity prices and relatively low ratios of capital
formation to gross product.35 Particularly in West Africa exception-
ally high cocoa prices caused large increases in sterling balances. These
areas received also less aid and investment than East and Central
Africa and the West Indies, which had higher capital formation
ratios. This suggests that the receipt of external finance does lead to
higher capital formation even though domestic resources may be
available. Development plans have to be made in advance and depend
on the funds which are expected to be available in grants and loans
in the London market. Budget surpluses which are the result of com-
modity price rises, on the other hand, cannot be foreseen. It may not
be possible to accelerate development as a result of such windfalls.
Surpluses of marketing boards resulting from price increases must be
held as a safeguard against future price declines. The resources which
these colonial sterling balances represent were thus not available, or
could not be utilized immediately, for the purposes which external
financing was designed to accomplish.
Capital Flows and Trade Orientations
In this section we examine to what extent the aid and investment of
the three centers, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Continental OEEC countries, were concentrated in the countries whose
trade relations were oriented towards them.3° Some of the reasons for
the distribution of capital which we observed will also be discussed.
The distribution of the long-term capital flows of the three main
suppliers according to trade orientation is shown in Table 3. Since we
are interested in the distribution of the capital supplied during this
period, repayments have been eliminated from the table, i.e., loans
included in government capital and private loans are shown gross,
84 See the New York Times, November 8, 1959, p. 7.
35 See OEEC, Economic Development of Overseas Countries and Territories Asso-
ciated with OEEC Member Countries, Paris, August 1958, pp. 249—265, where the
question of the sterling balances is treated in detail and which the discussion here
follows in part. The capital formation data are for 1956, but they are unlikely
to have changed much, and a time lag between receipt of funds and investment
must be considered.
86 For the classification of countries by trade orientations, see Appendix Table A.The Pattern of Capital Movements, 1950—54 61
TABLE 3
Distribution of Long-Term Capital of Group 1
Countries by Trade Orientation
From
Continental
United StatesUnited Kingdom OEEC
Mi!- Mi!- Mi!-
lions lions lions
of Per of Per of Per
To DollarsCentDollars'CentDollarsCent
U.S. and U.S.-oriented
Government capital 3,226 22.5 107 10 139 4
Portfolio issues 1,175 99.0 — — 19 4
Direct investment 4,936 72.0 625 25 678 53
Private loans 51450.0 27 37 154 37
U.K. and U.K.-oriented
Government capital 2,780 19.5 522 48.5 99 3
Portfolio issues 14 1.0 666 98.0 64 12
Direct investment 1,134 16.0 1,736 71.0 135 11
Private loans 212 20.0 46 63.0 17 4
Cont. OEEC and
Cont. OEEC-oriented
Government capital 8,218 58.0 447 41.53,057 93
Portfolio issues — — 14 2.0 428 84
Direct investment 795 12.0 98 4.0 460 36
Private loans 316 30.0 245 59
SOURCE: Matrix tables.
and redemptions and trading (Appendix Table B-IT), consisting mainly
of. redemptions, and repatriations (Appendix Table B-V) have been
excluded. For short-term credit the distribution could not be calcu-
lated.
The number of countries (including the countries of the centers
themselves) in each of the three trade-orientations is approximately
the same: twenty-seven in the U.S.-, twenty-six in the U.K.-, and
twenty-nine in the Continental OEEC-oriented groups.37 Thus, if the
37 The British dependencies were counted as five units (Central Africa, West
Africa, Western Hemisphere, Far East, Other); the French dependencies as three
units (North Africa, Other Africa, Other); the Belgian, Dutch, Italian, and Portu-
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centers only supplied approximately one-third (or less) of a given
type of capital to countries whose trade was oriented toward them,
we would conclude that the distribution of this type of capital did
not depend on the trade relationship of the recipient countries with
the center. In Table 3 there are two of the twelve cases which fall in
this category: the government capital of the U.S. and the direct invest-
ment of the Continent, where only 22.5 and 36 per cent, respectively,.
were supplied to their own trade orientations. In the other ten cases
there was a definite concentration of the supply in the own trade
orientations, ranging from approximately 50 to close to 100 per cent,
which appears to indicate dependence on the trade orientation, al-
though with considerable variation. In order to ascertain the reasons
for the variation and to see how much meaning can be attached to
the various percentages, we must examine the distribution of each
type of capital more closely.
GOVERNMENT CAPITAL
The distribution of government capital may be assumed to depend
on the political involvements of the donor country during the particu-
lar period. The small share of U.S.-oriented countries in American
aid was, of course, the result of the global role which the United
States had assumed. Recovery and mutual security aid to the Conti-
nental and Sterling OEEC countries was the major part, but American
government capital went also to most other U.K.- and Continent-
oriented countries. The share of the U.S.-oriented countries was thus
less than one-fourth. A large part of this $3.2 billion, moreover, went
to Far Eastern and other countries whose trade orientation toward
the U.S. was, in. considerable part, of recent origin and was, in fact,
largely determined by this American aid, e.g., Korea, Taiwan, and
Israel, where emergencies had arisen or new obligations had been
assumed. Latin America, on the other hand, the traditional sphere
of U.S. commercial interests, received only one-fourth of this amount.38
Thus the global commitments which the United States assumed after
World War II had the result that only a small share of American aid
went to U.S.-oriented countries, particularly those in Latin America
with the older trade ties to the U.S.
In the United Kingdom and the Continental OEEC countries, which
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had long-standing political and commercial ties with the colonial ter-
ritories, the shares of countries oriented toward them were higher.
In the case of the U.K. it was still less than half of the total, but in
the case of the Continent it was over 90 per cent. British aid to the
territories and to independent Sterling Area countries was relatively
small. British grants and loans under the OEEC arrangements (IEPA
and EPU grants and consolidation loans of payment arrears), aid to
Yugoslavia, a loan to a Canadian corporation for the production of
strategic materials, and various settlements with U.S.- and Continent-
oriented countries accounted, therefore, for somewhat more than half
of the U.K. total. Continental governments also had obligations to
countries outside their own trade orientation (e.g., the German com-
pensation payments to U.S.-oriented Israel). But the fact that grants
and loans under OEEC arrangements were mainly extended between
Continental countries and the large size of the French colonial aid
(close to $2 billion) resulted in the high concentration of Continental
government capital in their own trade-orientation group.
PORTFOLIO ISSUES
Portfolio lending showed a very high concentration in the trade
orientations of all three centers. There seems to be no prima facie
reason for this, however, since security flotations, largely funds raised
by governments, do not necessarily finance trade directly and may not
even be spent abroad. If there are no other constraints, interest rate
differentials presumably determine the market in which a borrower
floats an issue. In the past, the main financial centers, New York and
London, had been global lenders. In the last peak period of portfolio
lending, the decade of the 1920's, some fifty countries borrowed in
New York.3° The explanation of this high concentration during the
1950—54 period lies in the factors curbing portfolio lending mentioned
previously, namely, the experience of defaults during the Depression,
which resulted in very selective lending, and the restrictions of the
European markets because of balance-of-payments pressures. The issues
floated in the U.S. were thus virtually only those of the two special
cases, Canada and Israel, while borrowing in the U.K. and in Conti-
nental metropolitan countries was mainly or entirely confined to their
Ralph A. Young, Handbook on A merican Underwriting of Foreign Securities,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., pp. 11, 20, 75—137.64 Measuring International Capital Movements
respective currency areas. The trade orientations underlie, of course,
the currency areas, but it was the confinement of lending to the latter
which was the determining factor. Switzerland alone resembled the
markets of the past by lending to countries in all three trade orienta-
tions, although on a modest scale.
DIRECTINVESTMENT
Direct investment has a closer connection with trade than portfolio
investment, since machinery and equipment for subsidiaries and
branches are often supplied directly by the parent companies, invest-
ment in finance and trade are frequently connected with imports and
exports, and investment in primary production is usually made for
the purpose of supplying agricultural and mineral products to the
center. Consequently we do find a fairly high concentration of this
type of investment by the United States and the United Kingdom,
the main suppliers, in countries of their respective trade orientations,
although not for. the smaller Continental investment. The high per-
centage in the case of the United States is of particular significance
because, in contrast to the other lenders, the U.S. spread its invest-
ments very widely and the pattern is,therefore, less influenced by
random factors. An industrial breakdown is also available for U.S.
which makes it possible to ascertain the extent of the
concentration by industrial sectors. In every sector over half of the
investment was made in the U.S.-oriented countries, although with
considerable variation in the percentages. The concentration was high-
est in primary production (agriculture, 100, petroleum exploration
and extraction, 90, mining, 86 per cent) and in utilities and transpor-
tation (99 per cent). It was over 70 per cent in services (trade, 72,
and other, 79 per cent), and it was least in manufacturing (61 per
cent) and petroleum refining and distribution (51 per cent). This
40TheSurvey of Current Business provides breakdowns into seven sectors. Petro-
leum, which is reported as one sector, was divided into (1) exploration and extrac-
tion, and (2) refining and distribution, with information contained in the Oil and
Gas Journal. This was done in order to separate (1) investment mainly for export
from (2) investment for consumption in the host country. For major oil-producing
countries the petroleum investment was considered to be entirely in exploration
and extraction; since refineries in these countries mainly serve export.
In some cases where several sectors are combined in Survey of Current Business
tables, the divisions were estimated from regional totals or other evidence. For
references see Appendix B, Statistical Sources for Appendix Tables B-I to B-VII
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variation is due to the fact that the investments in the different sectors
were also dependent on the level of development of the countries in
which they were made. In order to examine the relative importance
of trade orientation and levels of development in the distribution,
it is best to exclude Canada (Group 2, U.S.-oriented), which accounted
for 42 per cent of total U.S. direct investment and for almost half
of the investment in primary production. Its proximity to the United
States was, one may assume, a more important factor than its level
of development in attracting large investments in primary production.
If Canada is excluded, still as much as 52 per cent of U.S. direct
investment went to U.S.-oriented countries, but in manufacturing and
petroleum refining and distribution the percentages fall to 37 and
30 per cent, respectively. Table 4 throws light on the relative impor-
tance of trade orientation and level of development in the distribu-
tion of the investment in each sector by relating the concentration
of the investment in U.S.-oriented countries to that in Groups 3 and 4.
As the table shows, investment in industries that went mainly to
underdeveloped countries was highly trade-oriented. This is particu-
TABLE 4
Partial Distribution of U.S. Direct Investment, by Sectors, Between Trade
Orientation and Economic Levels of Host Countries, 1950—54
(per cent)
Percentage of U.S. Direct
Investment Going to




Petroleum exploration and extraction 79 99




Petroleum refining and distribution 30 29
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larly true of investment in the production of primary goods, which
generally constitute the main exports of underdeveloped countries to
the center, and of investment in utilities and transportation.41 Invest-
ment in manufacturing and in petroleum refining and distribution,
on the other hand, was attracted to the markets of the high-income
countries and was, therefore, more related to the advanced level of
the countries in which it was made. Manufacturing investment is often
made to "jump over tariff walls," while oil refining may use crude
oil originating in third countries. These industries are, therefore, not
especially associated with trade with the center.
In the Trade, Other (services), and Manufacturing sectors, substan-
tial investment was made in the U.S.-oriented Latin American coun-
tries of Group S. In other words, the investment in these sectors made
in the underdeveloped countries was mainly in the more advanced
among them, and the dependence seems to have been as much on
the more advanced economic levels as on the trade orientation of the
countries. This is particularly true of Manufacturing where Group 4
alone received only .4 per cent of the total investment (excluding
Canada), indicating the strong dependence of this investment on more
advanced levels of development.
For the other two centers, the United Kingdom and the Continent,
the relation of the composition of investment to trade orientation
and levels of development seems to have been similar.42 Investment
in primary production was very largely made in countries of their
own trade orientation—chiefly in the dependencies, which received
the major part of European investment in the underdeveloped areas.
Investment in secondary and tertiary sectors, on the other hand, was
chiefly in Groups 1 and 2 and was less dependent on trade orientation.
The bulk of British investment outside the Sterling Area went to the
U.S. and Canada and was mainly in manufacturing and services, in-
cluding large insurance investments in the U.S. In the case of the
Continent relatively large investments in secondary and tertiary indus-
tries outside countries of their own trade orientation made up, in fact,
41 Utility and transportation investments as well as agricultural investments were
small, however, accounting together for only S per cent of U.S. investment. Such
investments were encountering increasing animosity in the host countries.
42 Breakdowns by sectors are not available in these cases, but the approximate
composition of the major part of the investments could be ascertained from part-
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the greater part of the total. It was mainly the sizable investment in
the United States by two smaller countries, the Netherlands (in the
petroleum refining and distribution sector) and SwItzerland (in manu-
facturing), which accounted for the low share (S7 per cent) of the
Continent and Continent-oriented countries themselves. The distri-
bution by sectors of the U.K.'s and the Continent's investment is,
therefore, not inconsistent with the findings in the case of the United
States. We shall come back to the distribution of investment by indus-
tries in relation to economic levels in the next section.
PRIVATE LOANS
The percentages of private loans indicate dependence on trade ori-
entation in all three cases. The United Kingdom, where the concen-
tration was largest (63 per cent in the U.K.-oriented countries), ex-
tended few loans, however, and the high percentage may not be very
meaningful since these loans went entirely to one country, South
Africa. The United States, the largest lender, showed the lowest con-
centration (50 per cent in the U.S.-oriented countries), while that of
the Continent in the Continent-oriented countries was 59 per cent.
The distribution of the loans of these two lenders by countries was
quite similar, however. A large part of the American loans outside
the own trade orientation was extended to Europe. These loans were
chiefly for general balance-of-payments purposes (i.e., hard currency
loans) and they served to supplement or. replace the diminishing aid
(as mentioned above). The Swiss loans, which made up the greater
part of the Continental loans within the own trade orientation, were
of the same nature and went roughly to the same countries. On the
other hand, the American loans within the own trade orientation went
mainly to developing countries in Latin America, but the Continental
loans extended outside the own trade orientation also went chiefly
to these same countries. These latter loans were more directly con-
nected with exports, often financing equipment for development proj-
ects. In the case of the Continental loans, they resulted, therefore,
from the efforts of the European countries to re-establish their export
trade and conquer new markets. Although one would expect these
export loans to follow the trade orientation this was not the case.
Thus, the relation of private loans to trade orientation seems to be.
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The apparently high dependence of capital flows on trade orienta-
tion observed in Table 3 is, therefore, somewhat misleading with re-
gard to private capital. The high concentration of portfolio lending
in the respective trade orientations was largely due to special circum-
stances. For direct investment the relationship varied by industrial
sector: Investment in primary production and utilities—which pre-
dominated in underdeveloped countries—was highly trade-oriented;
investment in manufacturing and oil refining and distribution, which
was attracted mainly by advanced countries, showed little dependence;
and investment in trade and other services, which also went largely
to more advanced countries, showed a relatively weak dependence on
trade orientation. For private loans no firm conclusions could be
drawn.
SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PATTERN
There are some other aspects of the pattern of capital flows during
this period which deserve comment, namely, the capital supply of the
United Kingdom and the Continent to the underdeveloped areas and
differences between them. In contrast to the United States, the Euro-
pean countries extended aid to few underdeveloped countries outside
the dependencies. The early fifties were, of course, still a period of
reconstruction in Europe. The demands of the home economies con-
tinued to be great. In Britain, the center of the Sterling Area, it
seemed particularly imperative to minimize drains on reserves and to
guard against inflation lest the pound be endangered. British govern-
ment aid was not only small in comparison to the large French aid,
but also in relation to its private capital supply. The countries of
Asia and the Middle East were very largely in the Sterling Area. A
number of them were Commonwealth members, and others were
within the British sphere of influence. Yet few of them received British
aid. The British considered releases of the sterling balances that had
been accumulated by a number of countries during the war as a kind
of aid, since the resulting "unrequited exports" put a strain on the
British economy. But such releases were of some substance only in the
cases of Egypt and Pakistan during this period. The demands of home
investment and defense, and the domestic demand for consumer du-
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credits, mainly finance capital goods and British exports of these
goods, generally did not rise, and sometimes declined, during this
period.43 The extraordinary increase in export credits which took
place in the case of the Continental countries thus did not occur in
Britain.
However, having been historically the chief capital market of the
world, Britain relied mainly on private capital to aid underdeveloped
countries." Thus, colonial aid was supplemented with London bond
issues of colonial governments. The British also felt an obligation to
give the Commonwealth members access to the market,45 but few
government issues resulted; among underdeveloped countries, only
Ceylon qualified for, or chose to float, a small issue. British delegations
to the Colombo Plan conferences pointed to the investment being
made in India as evidence of the contribution of British private invest-
ment.4° The British investment in India was, however, the exception
rather than the rule. British direct investment abroad was indeed
considerable, but it went in large part to advanced countries. In the
underdeveloped areas it was chiefly made in the territories which were
still under British control and which also received most of the aid.47
Thus, British investment cannot be said to have taken the place of
aid in the former empire.
In Latin America, where British investment had been large, there
was also a retreat rather than an expansion of British capital. And
colonial aid and investment were more than offset by the capital
inflow into the U.K. in the form of colonial sterling balances. As a
result of these uphill flows, the United Kingdom's net capital supply
to the underdeveloped areas as a whole was, in fact, negligible.
Continental aid and investment in the underdeveloped areas were
concentrated in the dependencies. By far the largest part of this flow
during the period under review consisted of $2 billion in French
SeePeter B. Kenen, British Monetary and the Balance of Payments,
1951—1957, Cambridge, 1960, pp. 24—26.
44Cmnd. '237, July 1957, The United Kingdom's 'Role in Commonwealth Devel-
opment; see also A. R. Conan, Capital imports into Sterling Countries, London,
1960, pp. 98—100.
45SeeMidland Bank Review, February 1954, p.12, and Colombo Plan, 3rd
Annual Report, Ottawa, 1954, p. 103.
46Cmd.9622, October 1955, °The Colombo Plan," U.K. section.
47Itmay well be that the lack of adequate data on British investment led to a
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colonial aid. The explanation of this large aid to the dependencies—
on an even larger scale in subsequent years—is to be found in the
French policy to induce the territories to maintain close political,
cultural, and economic relations with the mother country after inde-
pendence. As M. Pompidou has put it more recently:"...forus
Frenchmen it is somehow a need to defend the French tongue
[against]...astrengthening of the position of the English language"
(to which multilateral aid would lead).48
The bulk of the Continent's capital supply to the independent
underdeveloped countries consisted of the $1 billion in export credits,
which went, however, mainly to Group S, the more advanced among
these countries. These countries received, as mentioned previously,
similar loans and credits from the United States, while the other aid
they obtained consisted largely of IBRD loans. Since the "capacity to
repay" is presumably greater for more advanced countries than for
the least developed,49 there is some justification for supplying aid
through loans rather than grants to these countries. Nevertheless, the
extent to which this kind of finance was resorted to has a number of
disadvantages. Short-term credits are at best a haphazard way of financ-
ing development, since planning requires knowledge of the extent
to which external finance will be And the cumulative
short-term credits and the bunching of intermediate-term and long-
term loans have caused continuous balance-of-payments problems in
a number of countries.
Capital Flows and Levels of Development
PRIVATE CAPITAL
In the previous sections we saw that the larger part of private
capital went to the advanced countries. The receipts of government
and private long-term capital by countries and country groups are
shown in Table 5 both in absolute amounts and per capita. Of the
total supply of private capital of $12.9 billion, net, only 28 per cent
48Quotedby Goran Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered, OECD, Paris,
1966, p. 32; see also pp. 27—33 for a discussion of the controversy over foreign aid
in France.
49SeeP. N. Aid for Underdeveloped Coun-
tries," Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1961, p. 109.
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TABLE 5
Receipts of Government and Private Long-Term Capital, Net of Repayments,
Total Aggregative and Per Capita Amounts, 1950—54
Total Receipts
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Receipts Per Capita
(U.S. dollars) •
Govern- Pri- Govern- Pri-
Total ment vate Total ment vate
Total 28,897 16,015 12,882
GROUP 1 9,521 6,578 2,943 21.05 14.55 6.50
US 1,792 — 1,792 11.80 — 11.80
UK 1,742 1,189 553 34.65 23.65 11.00
Continent 5,301 4,872 429 31.70 29.15 2.55
Japan 686 517 169 8.30 6.25 2.05
GROUP 2 8,146 1,799 6,347 89.00 19.65 69.35
Canada 3,915 74 3,841 285.75 5.40280.35
Israel 781 478 303600.80 367.70233.10
Chile 143 22 121 23.45 3.60 19.85
UK-oriented 2,534 584 1,950 78.95 18.20 60.75
Iceland 38 37 1 265.50258.50 7.00
Ireland 123 79 44 41.05 26.40 14.65
Australia 859 190 669 104.80 23.20 81.60
New Zealand 138 —1 139 72.60 —.55 73.15
Rhodesia 394 86 308 61.55 13.40 48.15
S. Africa 982 193 789 78.50 15.40 63.10
Cont.-oriented 773 641 132 20.20 16.75 3.45
Denmark 114 165 —51 26.55 38.40 —11.85
Norway 336 299 37 101.80 90.60 11.20
Sweden 86 66 20 12.30 9.45 2.85
Finland —26 —24 —2 —6.50 —6.00 —.50
Argentina 172 91 81 10.00 5.30 4.70
(91) 44 (47)(36.40) 17.60 (18.80)
GROUP 3 3,766 2,545 1,221 20.55 13.90 6.65
US-oriented 1,921 683 1,238 19.10 6.80 12.30
Brazil 818 456 362 15.70 8.75 6.95
Colombia 157 56 101 13.90 4.95 8.95
Cuba 154 14 140 28.55 2.60 25.95
Mexico 394 149 245 15.30 5.80 9.50
Panama 49 5 44 61.25 6.25 55.00
Venezuela 349 3 346 64.60 .55 64.05
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1,845 1,862 —17 22.40 22.60 —.20
811 803 8 106.70 105.65 1.05
83 65 18 9.90 7.75 2.15
311 301 10 14.90 14.40 .50
63 77 —14 2.25 2.75 —.50
5 7 —2 3.85 5.40 —1.55
572 609 —37 35.30 37.60 —2.30
7,464 5,093 2,371 8.40 5.75 2.65
2,120 1,516 604 25.25 18.05 7.20
320 105 215 11.45 3.75 7.70
7 4 3 8.75 5.00 3.75
31 1 30 14.80 .50 14.30
12 13 —1 6.30 6.85 —.55
3 1 2 1.05 .35 .70
28 13 15 8.75 4.05 4.70
42 3 39 30.00 2.15 27.85
14 6 8 12.75 5.45 7.30
37 34 3 12.35 11.35 1.00
32 13 19 10.00 4.05 5.95
114 17 97 13.40 2.00 11.40
330 255 75 16.55 12.80 3.75
746 746 — 35.20 35.20 —
359 342 17 47.85 45.60 2.25
46 9 37 57.50 11.25 46.25
262 2 260 43.85 .50 43.35
57 57 — 81.45 81.45 —
2,512 1,354 1,158 3.60 1.95 1.65
1,126 991 135 1.80 1.60 .20
—30 —12 —18 —1.60 —.65 —.95
—5 12 —17 —.65 1.50 —2.15
445 326 119 1.25 .90 .35
195 169 26 2.60 2.25 .35
59 9 50 12.30 1.90 10.40
148 148 — 113.85 113.85
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TABLE5 (concluded)
Total Receipts





Govern- Pri- Govern- Pri-




Afghanistan 24 24 2.40 2.40
Indonesia 62 91 —29 .80 1.20 .40
Iran 137 137 7.20 7.20
Nepal 1 1 .15 .15 —
Thailand 36 39 3 1.95 .2.10 —.15
Ethiopia 28 12 16 1.65 .70 .95
Sudan —17 —8 —9 —1.95 —.90 —1.05
UKOverseasTerr. 1,386 363 1,023 18.00 4.70 .13.30
Cont.-oriented 2,832 2,223 609 27.25 21.40 5.85
Independents 20 27 7 .80 1.05 —.25
Egypt 1 10 —9 .05 .50 —.45
Syria 9 8 1 2.80 2.50 .30
Paraguay 10 9 1 7.15 6.45 .70
Cont. Overseas
Terr. 2,812 2,196 616 35.85 28.00 7.85
French 2,444 1,995 449 49.00 40.00 9.00
Belgian 223 79 144 14.40 5.10 9.30
Dutch 59 43 16 53.65 39.10 14.55
Ital. Somalia 51 51 42.50 42.50 —
Portuguese 35 28 7 3.20 2.55 .65
NOTE: Excluding Soviet Bloc, Indochina, and Australian New Guinea. Parentheses
indicate the figures are questionable. They are reported as "estimates," which are prob-
ably overstated; the identified private capital cancels out approximately.
SouRcE: Appendix Tables B-I through B-V; population data (1950), U.N. Demo-
graphic Yearbook, 1955, pp. 115 if., and 1963, Table 4.
aIncludesbudgetary aid.
went to the underdeveloped areas (Groups 3 and 4). Among the ad-
vanced countries it was those of Group 2, however, that received the
main share, close to one half of the total. Both major types, portfolio
and direct investment, favored Group 2, as did both major suppliers
of private investment, the United States and the United Kingdom.
The underdeveloped areas as a whole account, however, for two-thirds
of the world population (excluding communist countries), and Group
4 alone for over half, while Group 2 makes up only 6 per cent. Per74 MeasuringInternational Capital Movements
capita receipts of private capital declined, therefore, sharply from
Group 2 downward, i.e., the lower the per capita income of the group,
the smaller was the inflow of private investment per capita (see last
column of Table 5).
We pointed out previously the reasons why portfolio investment
has by and large avoided the underdeveloped countries since the
Depression and the war.; Presumably, however, direct investment, the
dominant form of private capital, is especially suited to the needs of
the underdeveloped countries because technological knowledge and
managerial skill are provided with the capital. Yet, the underdeveloped
areas attracted only a small share of the total. An explanation for
the relative sparseness of foreign investment in underdeveloped areas
was provided by the late Ragnar Nurkse, who gave two reasons. First,
underdeveloped countries do not attract investment for the domestic
market because their low per capita incomes yield insufficient aggre-
gate demand. The investment in these areas is, therefore, frequently
in raw material production for export—an often observed phenome-
non. But, Nurkse continued, the markets for raw materials are not
expanding to the extent that they did in the nineteenth century, and
synthetic substitutes have diminished the demand, curbing this form
of direct investment also.51
We have already discussed the industrial composition of direct
investment in the context of trade orientation. We found that (if
Canada is excluded) U.S. investment in primary production was
mainly made in underdeveloped countries, but that the more ad-
vanced among them, those in Group 3, also attracted substantial in-
vestment in manufacturing and services. By groups, the distribution
of U.S. direct investment between primary production and other
sectors is shown in Table 6.
On a per capita basisthe largest investments were made in ad-
51 Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries,
New York, 1958, pp.24—Si,82—89; see also UN, International Capital Movements
in the Inter-War Period, 1949, p.32.
52 Per capita receipts of direct investment alone were, in U.S. dollars:
Group 1 6.20 Group 3 8.70
US-oriented 18.60
Group 2 55.70 Cont..oriented 1.10
US-oriented 160.60
UK-oriented 44.20 Group 1 2.40
Cont.-oriented 9.40 US-oriented 7.40
UK-oriented 1.70
Cont.-oriented 3.10The Pattern of Capital Movements, 1950—54 75
TABLE 6
Distribution of U.S. Direct Investment Between Primary
and All Other Sectors, 1950—54
(per cent)
Primary
Country Group Production All Other Not Specified
Groupl 100 -
Group 2 36 64 -
Group 2 ex.Canada 21 79 —
Group 3 27 70 3
Group 4 70 28 2
NOTE: The evidence for the other investor countries suggests that the composition
was similar, viz.: primary production was nil or negligible in Group 1, constituted the
smaller part in Groups 2 and 3 (and a smaller proportion in Group 3 than in Group 2),
but accounted for two-thirds or more of the investment in Group 4 (see Waither P.
Michael, "International Capital Movements, The Experience of the Early Fifties (1950—
1954)," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1965, pp. 163—172).
SOURCE: See footnote 40 in text.
aIncludingpetroleum refining and distribution.
vanced countries with expanding markets, particularly those of Group
2 and to a smaller degree in the intermediate Latin American coun-
tries of Group 3. But, while investments in the manufacturing and
service sectors of the countries in these groups were generally large,
substantial investments in the primary sector were also made in several
of these countries. Where investments of the latter type were large in
these countries they were accompanied by still substantial investments
in other sectors. Among the countries where both kinds were com-
bined were particularly Canada, South Africa, Cuba, and Venezuela.
On the other hand, investment was relatively smaller in those groups
of countries where it was only made in nonprimary sectors, as in the
Continent-oriented countries of Group 3, or mainly in the primary
sector, as in Group 4.Group1 also falls in this category, in that only
nonprimary investment was made, but here more limited opportuni-
ties for foreign investment during this period were presumably the
main reason for the lower per capita figure. The Scandinavian coun-
tries (in Continent-oriented Group 2) are on the Group 1 level with
the exception of Norway where investment in shipping was large.76 Measuring International Capital Movements
The first part of Nurkse's explanation seems, therefore, to be borne
out: investment for the domestic market declined with per capita
In the majority of the underdeveloped countries, those in
Group 4 with the lowest incomes, it was generally small and scattered.
As far as the flow of capital into primary production is concerned,
however, it is not so much that this investment was small but that it
went to a considerable degree to more advanced countries. The Amer-
ican mining and oil extraction investment in Canada alone, in excess
of $1 billion, exceeded the whole U.S. investment in Group 4.
A further factor accounting for the low receipts of some areas was
an "unfavorable investment climate" or the existence of military
emergencies in a number of countries. Particularly in several U.K.-
oriented countries of Group 4 whose receipts were among the lowest,
and where raw material investment had previously been important,
no investment was made or repatriations occurred.54
This pattern of private investment was not unlike that of the half
century before World War I. Data on capital movements during that
period are far from complete, particularly with regard to the under-
developed countries of today. But there seems little doubt that the
largest investments were made in the "areas of recent settlement."
These are the countries that are included in our Group 2, except that
the largest capital importer of that period, the United States, has re-
placed Britain as the largest supplier. As several writers have pointed
out,56 the capital flows to these countries complemented enormous
immigration of skilled labor, providing the overhead capital which
opened up the new lands and gave their products access to the world
market.
This description does not fit the conditions in the early 1950's
except in one case, the newcomer Israel, with its large immigration.
Although we noted special motivations in the supply of portfolio
capital to Israel, that country does present some similarities to the
58 See also Peter B. Kenen, Giant Among Nations, 1962 edition, p. 128—129.
54 For example, Iran under the Mossadegh regime, and Indonesia, where small
investments were offset by disinvestments; see also Appendix Table B-V.
See Ragnar Nurkse, "International Investment TodayS in the Light of Nine-
teenth Century Experience," Economic Journal, December 1954, pp. 744—758; see
also Douglass C. North in U.S. Private and Government Investment Abroad, op. cit.,
pp. 81 if.
56 Nurkse, ibid.; North, ibid.; A. K. Cairncross, Home and Foreign Investment,
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areas of recent settlement of the nineteenth century. Its receipt of
private capital per capita greatly exceeded those of all other countries
except Canada, and if one includes government aid,its per capita
receipts of $600 for the five years were more than twice even those
of Canada. But immigration does not provide the explanation for
the continued concentration of private investment in the other coun-
tries of this group. Having achieved a modern infrastructure and gen-
erally high living standards, these countries now attracted investment
mainly in manufacturing and services, although in some cases sub-
stantial raw material investment continued or was begun. This situa-
tion was not wholly unique to Group 2. It also prevailed in the more
advanced Latin American countries in Group 3, especially Brazil,
Colombia, and Mexico.
Conditions in the underdeveloped areas, however, are very different
from those in the developing countries of the past. Consequently, in
the majority of the underdeveloped countries private capital provided
neither for social overhead development nor for industrial diversifica-
tion. Colonial administrations had access to the metropolitan capital
markets, it is true, but these were restricted by the heavy demand
placed upon them by reconstruction at home. The territories involved
accounted also for only 14 per cent of the population of Group 4.
In a few cases oil companies made substantial investments in refineries
for the domestic market, namely in India and the Philippines, but
in the latter case the inducement was mainly the granting of explora-
tion franchises which were contingent upon the refinery. Otherwise
private capital was attracted mostly by primary production in these
areas, investment in secondary and tertiary industries being generally
small and scattered. This conforms also to the pattern of the past.57
The disadvantages of this kind of investment for underdeveloped
countries have often been pointed out. It is said to create or perpetuate
"dual economies," in which the efficient export sector, utilizing foreign
technology and often foreign personnel, may not induce further devel-
opment in the indigenous subsistence sector.58 Moreover, the establish-
ments are usually much larger than in other industries. During the
51 Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation, op. cit., p. 84; see also North,
op. cit., p. 34.
58W. Singer, "The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing
Countries," American Economic Review, May 1950, pp. 475—477; see also Nurkse,
Problems of Capital Formation, op. cit., and P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, op. cit., P. 110.78 MeasuringInternational Capital Movements
period 1951—57, for instance, primary investment accounted for 49 per
cent of the value of new establishments founded by U.S. parent com-
panies, but for only 19 per cent of their The diffusion of
the effect of the investment on the economy is thus likely to be much
smaller than for other industries. The very scale of the operations
requires equipment that cannot be produced in these countries and
has to be imported.60 On the other hand, in countries where modern
technology and scientific methods have not penetrated at all, this kind
of investment may provide new social services, such as education and
medical services, as in the well-known case of Aramco in Saudi Arabia.
Furthermore, royalties and tax receipts provide the government with
important sources of development funds, and export proceeds supply
needed foreign exchange. While raw material investment for export is,
therefore, certainly not without benefit, it is not likely to have as
great and direct an effect on the development of the host country as
does investment for the domestic market.6'
Although the share of the underdeveloped areas in private capital
was relatively small, per capita receipts varied considerably within
groups. Such variation is attributable, of course, to a number of factors,
but it is accentuated by raw material investment, since large amounts
of such investment are frequently made in countries with relatively
small populations. The sixteen U.S.-oriented countries in Group 4,
for instance, had the highest per capita receipts of direct investment
in that group ($7.40 as given in footnote 52 above); but if Peru and
Saudi Arabia with large mining and petroleum investment are ex-
cluded, the figure falls to $3.90.
GOVERNMENT CAPITAL AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
In view of the fact that private investment was largely attracted to
advanced countries, how did the distribution of government capital
compare to that of private capital? Due to the massive European re-
covery aid, the share of Group 1 was, of course, the largest, 41 per
cent of the total of $16,015 million shown in Table 5. But this was
59 U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Business Investments in Foreign Countries,
Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 100. The petroleum sector includes refining and distri-
bution; if only exploration and extraction were included, the phenomenon would
probably be more pronounced.
60 Kenen, op. cit., p. 118.
61 See also Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation, op. cit., pp. 24—25 and 84.The Pattern of Capital Movements, 1950—54 79
peculiarto this period. For the three capital importing groups the
shares increased downward, from 11 to 16 to 32 per cent for Groups 2,
3, and 4, respectively. This pattern was true of each major donor-
lender, the U.S., the U.K.,62 and the Continent. In the latter two
cases, however, the distribution was influenced by reparations and
other contractual payments, while their development aid went mainly
to the dependencies where their private investment in the under-
developed areas was also concentrated. The distribution is more inter-
esting in the case of the United States, which supplied the larger part
of both aid and investment, and whose capital was globally dispersed.
In this case the distribution of government aid was inversely related.
to that of private capital in the three groups, the shares of private
capital decreasing, and those of government aid increasing with the
declining level of development, as seen in the text table.
Government AidPrivate Capital
(per cent) (per cent)
Group 2 21 68
Group 3 35 18
Group 4 44 14
Total 100 100
While these figures include emergency aid, which is influenced by
factors exogenous to economic level, development aid showed a simi-
lar distribution (24, 33, and 42 per cent). The available supply of U.S.
aid was thus distributed so as to somewhat offset the inverse relation-
ship between receipts of private capital and level of development.
Returning to Table 5, we find, however, that per capita receipts of
government capital, like those of private capital, declined with the
level of development from Group 2 downward. On a per capita basis,
Group 2 had the highest receipts not only of private capital, but also
of officialcapital.(If the U.S. population is excluded, Group1
showed the highest per capita aid receipts.) While Group 2 includes
most of the countries which were least eligible for government aid
(e.g., Canada and the sterling countries), IBRD loans and govern-
ment loans for the supply of strategic materials raised the per capita
62Forthe U.K., Group 2 aid was larger than that extended to Group 3; but the
former includes a consolidation loan, i.e., not new capital.80 Measuring International Capital Movements
receipts of official capital above those of most underdeveloped coun-
tries. In Groups 3 and 4, moreover, all aid receipts over $10 per
capita were cases of aid for reconstruction, political or military emer-
gencies and famine relief, or aid to dependencies or countries under
Allied administration. The countries and territories involved ac-
counted for only 17 per cent of the population of Groups 3 and 4
(excluding the Soviet Bloc). The more or less pure development aid
to independent countries resulted in the lowest per capita receipts.
Moreover, these declined with the level of development. Thus, on a
per capita basis, government aid did not compensate the under-
developed areas for their small share of private capital.
The question whether the aid to the underdeveloped areas during
this period was inadequate can be answered, however, only with
reference to the "absorptive capacity" for capital of these countries.
Unfortunately, there is as yet no generally accepted method of calcu-
lating the amounts which these countries could productively employ.
The estimates of capital requirements which have been made are gen-
erally projections for the 1960's and 1970's. Some of these are based
on parameters of past economic performance of individual countries
with assumptions about possible growth rates limited by absorptive
capacity. Others are estimates of the projected "foreign exchange
gap." 63Theestimates vary widely in the magnitude of the required
aid. A comparison with even the lowest of these estimates, those by
which assume extremely moderate growth rates
for most countries, would suggest that the aid actually extended dur-
ing 1950—54 was grossly inadequate. It amounted to 30 per cent of
the estimated requirements of the underdeveipped countries as a
whole. But since aid was highly concentrated, for most countries the
discrepancies between aid and requirements were much larger than
this average, while in the few countries with very high receipts the
requirements were exceeded. In the countries with the lowest per
capita incomes, the U.K.- and Continent-oriented independent coun-
tries of Group 4, the aid receipts came to approximately 10 per cent
of requirements estimated by Rosenstein-Rodan.
/
63 SeeGoran Ohlin, op. cit., pp.76—80, fora comparison of the various estimates.
O4Rosenstein-Rodan, op. cit.; these estimates are also the most suitable for corn-
parison because they were made for individual countries; for the comparison see
Waither P. Michael, op. cit., pp. 266—270.5
THE FEASIBILITY OF
CONSTRUCTING CAPITAL FLOW
ACCOUNTS FOR LATER PERIODS
The pattern of capital movements described above covers an early
part of the postwar period. While some aspects of this pattern, par-
ticularly the concentration of U.S. aid in Europe, were peculiar to
this period, the distribution of private investment and aid among the
capital importing groups is not. How this distribution works out for
later years, after aid to Europe had ceased and European recovery
had been accomplished, must remain for further study.
A continuation of this study would very likely encounter problems
similar to those for the early 1950's, although improvements in the
reported data have taken place. The staff of the Balance of Payments
Division of the Fund has, of course, exerted steady efforts in this re-
spect, and new information has become available in many cases. The
U.K. balance of payments, which included only net figures for private
capital, distinguishes, from 1958 on, assets and liabilities, and direct
and other investment. A country breakdown of direct investment
(including reinvested profits) is also available beginning with 1958,
although there are some gaps in the While the procedure
in this case obviously will be simplified, the British account still will
have to be supplemented with partner data and other sources, even
from 1958 on. The records of the continental countries seem to have
improved also, as spot checks of balance-of=payments reports reveal,
and as is also indicated by the tables of aid and investment flows to
the underdeveloped countries in the OECD studies, which are based
on member countries' reports.2 Private investment seems generally
better covered and identified by type. Regional distributions by cur-
1 H. M. Stationery Office, Board of Trade Journal, 6 October 1961, pp. 7 15—720.
2 See, e.g., OECD, The Flow of Financial Resources to Less-Developed Countries.
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rency areas, which were of very limited use, have been replaced by
more meaningful ones. While these improvements have come only
gradually (Sweden, for instance, omits all direct investment until
1962), the identification of the Continental transactions will be made
easier for later years than for the early 1950's.
On the other hand, there is the evidence, discussed above, which
seemed to indicate that the Continental countries continued to under-
state their outflows in 1963 and 1964. The procedure will, therefore,
still have to rely heavily on partner data and other sources to identify
the capital flows of the European suppliers and supplement their data
not only for the years directly following 1954 but probably for later
years as well. There are always details of information available in
the balance-of-payments statements, investment censuses, or other
sources of some countries that make it possible to identify transac-
tions and to fill gaps in other records. The publications of the OECD
and the UN will also be very useful, particularly regarding the flow
of official capital.
One problem in any attempt to reconstruct capital flows for recent
periods is the length of time which elapses before the reported data
are firm. At present each of the Fund's Yearbooks carries revisions
of the data for the four years preceding the latest one covered. There
is, therefore, always a lag of five years at the time of publication of
the most recent data. In the process of this study substantial revisions
were encountered in a number of important accounts. Very large re-
visions in the U.S. direct investment figures, particularly of the data
for foreign investment in the U.S., did not appear until 1963.
It is hoped that the data can be further improved, especially those
of the Continental countries. It would also be very helpful if for the
transactions of these countries more detailed breakdowns could be
provided, particularly of private capital, of the kind which the United
States supplies, and which are also now available for the United King-
dom. It should be possible to improve balance-of-payments data to
the point where one can construct integrated accounts of world capi-
tal transactions on an annual basis. Such accounts would be of obvi-
ous value to students of international trade and economic develop-
ment. It is hoped that this study will contribute in some measure
toward this end.